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This paper studies the impact of global factors on patterns of basic research across countries and time. We 
rely on the records of major scientific awards, and on data dealing with global economic and historical 
trends. Specifically, we investigate the degree to which scale or threshold effects account for countries 
share of major prizes [Nobel, Fields, Kyoto and Wolf]. We construct a stylized model, predicting that 
lagged relative GDP of a country relative to the GDP of all countries engaging in basic research is an 
important explanatory variable of country’s share of prizes. Scale effects imply that the association between 
the GDP share of a country and its prize share tends to be logistic -- above a threshold, there is a “take off” 
range, where the prize share increases at an accelerating rate with the relative GDP share of the country, 
until it reaches “maturity” stage. Our empirical analysis confirms the importance of lagged relative GDP in 
accounting for countries’ prize shares, and the presence of "winner takes all" scale effect benefiting the 
leader. Using measures of casualties during the wars, we find that the only significant effect can be found 
for a lag of 3 decades – i.e., deaths in the war negatively impact the viability of basic research about 30 
years after the fact. With more recent data, we document the growing importance of countries that used to 
be at the periphery of global research, possibly advancing towards the take off stage.  
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This paper studies the impact of global factors on patterns of basic research across countries and 
time. Understanding creativity and path breaking scientific research remains a black box.  Short 
of having detailed information on networks of scientific research, and the effort associated with 
these networks, we rely on the records of major scientific awards, and on data dealing with 
global economic and historical trends.  Specifically, the cumulative record of major prizes 
includes more than a hundred years of Nobel laureates in Chemistry, Medicine and Physics; as 
well as the shorter but significant record of the Fields Medal, Kyoto and Wolf prizes for basic 
research.  We use this information to study the degree to which scale or threshold effects account 
for countries share of major prizes.   
  Related questions were investigated in the context of economic development.  For 
example, an intriguing study by Davis and Weinstein (2002 and 2004) inquired into the 
distribution of economic activity within Japan over the long run, finding that even very large 
temporary shocks to urban areas have no long-run impact on city size.  They examine this 
question in the context of the intense Allied bombing of Japanese cities and industries in WWII, 
finding that in the aftermath of even immense shocks, a city typically recovers not only its 
population and its share of aggregate manufacturing, but even the composition of specific 
industries it had before.  Hence, they do not find support for path dependency, which frequently 
has been linked to returns to scale [see Krugman (1991) and David (2000)].  To the best of our 
knowledge, little research was done on these questions in the context of basic scientific research.  
The immense global shocks of the 20
th century provide the background to our investigation, 
asking questions akin to Davis and Weinstein: the degree to which economic might and World 
Wars have affected basic scientific research in enduring ways.  We also use the combined data of 
major prizes to gauge the emergence of new trends.   
  To grasp the issues involved, Figure 1A plots the decade averages of shares of Nobel 
prizes for science (Chemistry, Medicine and Physics) during the 20
th century, where the time unit 
is five year segments starting from 1900-1904. The most dramatic development, apparent in this 
figure, has been the take off of the U.S. share, starting from 0%, and reaching about 70% by the 
end of the century. Figure 2 plots the U.S. GDP as share of total GDP of all countries for which 
at least 10 science Nobel prizes were awarded from 1900 to 2005, and the U.S. share of Nobel 
prizes for sciences, where GDP share is lagged by two decades (reflecting the average gap 
between timing of research and the awarded prizes).  The fitted line in figure 2 is a third order   3
polynomial.  The figures suggest that the U.S. take off has been closely linked to the sizable 
increase in the U.S. GDP share, as well as the decline in the share of Germany.  The purpose of 
our paper is to look systematically at the factors accounting for these dramatic changes, putting it 
in the context of a model that provides possible links between relative GDPs and prize shares, in 
the presence of scale effects associated with scientific research.    
  Figure 2 suggests that the association between GDP and Prize shares is logistic.  This 
observation is consistent with the predictions of a stylized model described in the next section, 
explaining countries prize share in the presence of scale effects associated with basic research.  
Specifically, the model predicts that lagged relative GDP of a country relative to the GDP of 
other countries engaging in basic research is an important explanatory variable of country’s share 
of prize.  Scale effects imply that the association between the GDP share of a country and its 
prize share tends to be logistic -- above a threshold; there is a “take off” range, where the prize 
share increases at an accelerating rate with the relative GDP share of a country, until it reaches a 
“maturity” stage.   
Simulating a simple version of our model suggests that it fits well the first part of the U.S. 
basic research take-off, but under-predicts its speed [see Figure 5].  This observation follows an 
intriguing discontinuity of the U.S. basic research take-off: the U.S. prize shares were either 
below 15% during most of the first third of the 20
th century, or well above 40% after 1940.  Our 
empirical analysis confirms the importance of lagged relative GDP in accounting countries’ prize 
shares, and the presence of "winner takes All" scale effect.  The “winner takes all" effect may be 
further reinforced by immigration patterns: from 1936 onward, 73 of U.S. Nobel laureates were 
awarded to immigrants from other countries, amounting to 18.2% of the total Nobel prizes in 
basic research awarded to all countries from 1936.  The corresponding Nobel awards gained 
through immigration by other major recipient countries are 15 for the UK, 12 for Switzerland, 
and only 4 for Germany (see table 1A). During that time, 26 Nobel prizes were German 
immigrants, 8 Nobel foreign laureates were born in Austria, 7 in the UK, 7 in Canada, 6 in 
Hungary, 5 in Poland, and 4 in Russia (see Table 1B for more details).
1  Our analysis is 
consistent with the notion that the World Wars set in motion forces that hasten the U.S. take-off, 
and suggests that immigration patterns accelerated this process.      
                                                 
1 Hence, the “net immigration” of Nobel laureates from 1936 has been 73 to the US, 12 for Switzerland, 8 for the 
UK, - 1 for France, - 4 for Russia, -5 for Poland, - 5 for China, -6 for Hungary, - 7 for Canada, - 8 for Austria, - 21 
for Germany.   4
A by-product of our analysis is that, ceteris paribus, the return toward a more symmetric 
configuration among leading industrial countries will reverse overtime some of the trends 
observed during the 20
th century.  A glimpse into this possibility is provided in Figure 1B, 
plotting the combined prize share of all countries minus Europe and the U.S., referred as AOC 
(All Other Countries).  In reading this figure, one should keep in mind the two decade average 
lag between the actual research, and the awarded research.  Figure 1B suggests two instances of 
impending AOC takeoffs during the last 70 years; the first is 1940-1960 (reflecting research 
done, on average, during 1920-1940), and 1990-2005 (reflecting research done during 1970-
1985).  The first takeoff was apparently aborted due the upheaval associated with the WWII.  
These trends are further reinforced by looking of the aggregation of the Nobel with the other 
prizes for basic research (see Figure 1B).  
In our concluding remarks we outline important issues that are not dealt with in the 
present paper, like the role of the public versus private funding of basic research, quality of 
governance, the changing roles of research networks and the diffusion of information technology, 
etc.  Section 1 outlines a stylized model explaining key determinants of basic research — the 
detailed model is in Appendix A.  Section 2 discusses the data used in the paper.  Section 3 
summarizes the empirical regularities and the results of regressions explaining the changing prize 
shares of various countries.  Section 4 concludes.   
 
 
1.   Stylized model of key determinants of basic research. 
  This section outlines a stylized model, used to identify possible variables applied in our 
empirical study.  Awarding prizes to basic research is the outcome of a periodic contest among 
the stock of major recent contributions.  The definition of “recent” is bounded by scholars’ life 
expectancy since prizes are not awarded posthumously.  The inter-temporal importance of major 
contributions is determined by the speed of diffusion of knowledge.  As we do not have a 
tractable way of comparing the relative importance of the major contributions, we adopt a simple 
threshold approach:  all major scientific contributions vintage of the same period are treated as 
equal candidates for wining the prize contest.  The arrival rate of major contributions in a country 
depends on the knowledge in the country, potentially interacted with the ‘global stock’ of 
knowledge in non linear ways due to scale and networking effects.  Such knowledge is dubbed in   5
economics as “human capital,” evolving over time as the outcome of investment, adjusted for 
depreciation caused by aging, calamities like wars, etc.
2  The investment in human capital 
depends positively on the scale of the economy that supports the research, like the real GDP, real 
GDP pre capita, etc.  
  A key aspect of scientific research is the presence of returns to scale, possibly due to 
fixed costs and networking effects.  Specifically, basic research may lack immediate commercial 
use, yet it is associated with significant fixed and set-up costs (costs of setting laboratory, 
running experiments, etc…).  These costs may be prohibitive enough to be supported only by few 
rich countries, in few well endowed centers.   Hence, one expects that these centers will be a 
magnet for scientific work, leading to scale economics and agglomeration (see CERN in 
Switzerland,
3 or the Brookhaven national laboratory in the U.S.
4).  Furthermore, research 
benefits frequently from peer interaction, leading to network externalities, where doubling the 
number of scholars in the network may more than double the productivity of the network.
5   
These considerations suggest that doubling the investment in knowledge more than double the 
efficacy of research.  Further magnification of these effects occurs when scholars are mobile; 
implying that research centers located in countries that are friendlier to immigrants would be 
attractors of talent, ending up as key research hubs.  Conversely, research hubs may be destroyed 
rapidly if tolerance towards immigrants diminishes, or if calamities reduce the resources 
available to basic research, as has been vividly illustrated in the first half of the 20
th century.          
                                                 
2 Human capital is the stock of expertise, knowledge, and skill, embodied in an individual as a result of education, 
training, and experience, that makes them more productive [see Becker (1975) for conceptualizing and measuring 
human capital].  
 
3 CERN (French for European Nuclear Research Centre) is located near Geneva.  Its recent purchase of Europe's 
flagship particle accelerator (LHC) has been associated with capital costs of more than $ 2 B.  A Why Geneva Web 
page credits the proximity of CERN to making Geneva a research hub:  “Many of the no fewer than 44 Nobel prizes 
awarded to residents of Geneva came as a result of the presence of CERN in the city” (see 
http://www.geneva.ch/f/lhc.htm). The presence of prize winning immigrants is also evident in our table 1A and 1B.  
 
4 Established in 1947 on Long Island, Upton, New York, Brookhaven is a multi-program national laboratory 
operated by Brookhaven Science Associates for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Six Nobel Prizes have been 
awarded for discoveries made at the Lab.  Brookhaven has a staff of approximately 3,000 scientists, engineers, 
technicians and support staff and over 4,000 guest researchers annually (see http://www.bnl.gov/world/ ).  
 
5 Network externalities refer to the effects on a user of a service of others using the same services. Positive network 
externalities exist if the benefits are an increasing function of the number of other users.  For example, a network 
connecting n scholars entails potential 0.5n(n-1) pair interactions.  If the productivity of the network depends 
linearly on pair interactions, doubling the network would almost quadruple network’s productivity.  This effect is 
further magnified if, as is frequently the case, basic experimental research needs a sizable crew of scholars, well 
above pair interactions.     6
  The focus of our study is on the degree to which macroeconomic variables, interacted 
with history, explain the cross country distribution of basic research, quantified by the countries’ 
share of Nobel and other major scientific prizes.  We concentrate on countries that have reached 
the threshold level of development needed to afford meaningful investment in basic research, and 
refrain from modeling the micro details of the network effects associated with scientific research.  
We consider a stylistic model, where scale effects may imply that the arrival rate of scientific 
contributions depends in a non linear manner on human capital.  The human capital of the 
country follows a simple accumulation rule, where a fraction of the real GDP is invested into 
forming future human capital.   
  The details of the model are provided in the Appendix.  To illustrate some of its 
predictions, it’s handy to consider a simple case.   Suppose that all countries doing basic research 
are aggregated into 2 blocks, say the USA and All Other Countries (AOC) that are part of the 
research frontier.  To simplify further, assume that the OAC block is composed of n symmetric 
countries, and define the unit of time (= a period) to cover a generation of scientists (say 25 
years).  Suppose further that all the countries engaging in basic research differ only in their scale, 
having the same productivity and accumulation parameters.  These assumptions allow us to solve 
the prize share of the U.S. as a function of the lagged real U.S. GDP relative to all other countries 
GDP.   
Figure 3a illustrates the solution, plotting the U.S. share of the prizes predicted by our 
model as a function of the relative GDP share of the U.S./AOC.  The bold curve corresponds to 
the benchmark case of two countries (the USA and AOC), the absence of foreign human capital 
externality (i.e., only domestic human capital contributes to the scientific contributions of the 
country), and significant scale effects.  The solid curve to the left of the bold plots the case where 
AOC are composed of two symmetric countries (keeping all other assumptions).  Note that more 
fractured composition of AOC reduces the research effectiveness there, increasing thereby USA 
share.  The dotted curve modifies the benchmark by allowing modest human capital externality, 
where foreign human capital impact domestic research by 5%.  Human capital externality 
increases the share of the smaller block, at the expense of the larger block.  Figure 3b plots the 
same curves in the absence of returns to scale in research.  Removing scale effects considerably 
mitigates the prize share of the larger block (increasing thereby the share of the smaller block).  It   7
also implies simple additivity of the countries composing the AOC block, and eliminates the 
inflection point. 
The association between the relative GDP shares and the prize share in the presence of 
scale effects resembles a logistic curve.   The appendix shows that greater scale effects implies 
higher threshold of relative GDP is needed in order to reach the “taking off” range associated 
with the accelerating increase in the prize share.  Once this range has been reached, the takeoff is 
faster.  This result is illustrated in Figure 4a, focusing on the case where the scale effect is 
magnified from 2 [the bold curve] to 4 [the solid curve], drawn for the case where AOC is 
composed of a unique country.  Figure 4b replicate this exercise for the case where the AOC is 
fractured into two symmetric countries.  As one may expect, it implies that the U.S. takes off at a 
lower relative share.  Figure 5 add to the U.S. Nobel shares / lagged U.S. share of World GDP 
during the 20
th centaury the share corresponding to a simulated version of the stylistic model.  
While the model is capturing well the first part of the take off, it underestimate the speed of 
reaching the “mature stage” of the U.S.  Our empirical work suggests that some of the fast take 
off of the U.S. may be accounted by the effects of the two World Wars, disrupting research 
networks in favor of the U.S.
6   
 
The above model offers several predictions, some summarized below:  
•  Lagged relative GDP of a country relative to the GDP of other countries engaging in 
basic research is an important explanatory variable of country’s share of prize.   
•  Scale effects imply that above a threshold, there is a “take off” range, where the prize 
share increases at accelerating rate with the relative GDP share of a country, until it 
reaches “maturity” stage.  
•  A more fractured AOC block reduces in the presence of scale effects the relative GDP 
needed to induce a prizes share “take off”.   
•  Greater fluidity of the flow of information and scholars across countries (possibly due to 
the proliferation of IT technology and the drop of airfares) increases the externality 
associated with foreign human capital, mitigating thereby the advantages of the large 
block induced by scale effects. 
                                                 
6 Other obvious shortcomings are that our simulation assumes the key parameters [the scale effects, number of 
countries engaged in basic research, etc.] have been constant during the 20
th centaury, and the imposed equal 
productivity of all the relevant countries.   8
 
2. Data 
Our data is generally taken from two sources. Data on prizes is obtained from the official 
websites of the respective prizes. When the relevant biographical data was not available in the 
prize’s website, we obtained additional information from other on-line sources. All the 
macroeconomic data is taken from The World Economy: Historical Statistics CD-ROM based on 
data compiled by Maddison (2003).  
For the Nobel prizes, we note the country in which each recipient resided at the time of 
the award. We also record the country location and the decade in which the research for which 
the award was given was conducted – this data is obtained by reading the narrative biographical 
description of each awardee. In case no description was provided (as for some of the early Nobel 
awards) we obtained this data from other sources. We start from the first Nobel awards presented 
in 1901 and do not record the Economics, Peace and Literature awards.  Our sample covers 509 
Nobel prizes awarded in Chemistry, Medicine and Physics during 1901-2005.
7  
We record the same variables for the Wolf Prize, given annually in agriculture, chemistry, 
mathematics, medicine and physics since 1978 [199 Wolf Prizes]; the Kyoto Prize, given 
annually in advanced technology and basic sciences since 1985 [47 awarded]; and the Fields 
Medal, given every four years in mathematics since 1936 [44 awarded]. 
We construct two separate panel data-sets. The first includes five-year totals for prizes 
awarded, per country-5 years observation. In this dataset, each prize is recorded for the year in 
which it was awarded and the location of the researcher/s at the time of the award. In the second 
data set, we compile a panel of country-decade observations in which each prize award is 
recorded for the time in which the most important awarded research was done and at the location 
in which that research took place.  
Hence, a prize awarded for research done in Germany but awarded to a scientist who was 
residing in the UK 20 years later at the time of the award, will, for the 5-years dataset, be counted 
                                                 
7 A few papers have looked at the same Nobel data from a micro perspective (without aggregation) in research 
examining the life-cycle characteristics of innovation. See, in particular, Jones (2005) and Weinberg and Galenson 
(2005).  
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for the UK at the time of the award. For the 10-years dataset, the prize would be credited to 
Germany 20 years before the award.
8
Since for many of the smaller countries, very few awards were given during this past 
century, we record this data in 10 separate country groups: the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, France, Scandinavia, other European countries, Australia & Canada, Japan, 
the USSR (and later Russia), and all other countries (these include those countries that received 
at least one prize).
9 Correlations between the different prize measures is provided in appendix B.  
For the macroeconomic data, we use GDP (in constant 1990 international dollars), and 
population measures taken from Maddison (2003). These measured are averaged over 5(10) 
years for the 5(10) years data panels. To measure the WWI and WWII casualties, we obtain data 
on war deaths (both civilian and military) and divide those by the population in each country. 
The WWI casualties are attributed to 1916-1920, or 1911-1920 in the cases of the 5- and 10-
years datasets, respectively. Appendix B details data sources and descriptive statistics. 
 
3.  Empirical results 
We stipulate an empirical model that is based on equation (A4) of the theoretical model 
we developed in the Appendix. Since we are interested in the amount of generated basic research, 
as proxied by the amount of prizes won, we stipulate a benchmark model in which the share of 
each country’s prizes (out of the total global amount) depends on a country’s income (GDP) and 
its population.
10 Since GDP per capita might be the relevant income measure to approximate the 
amount of resources available for domestic R&D investment, we speculate that the population 
variable might have a negative coefficient.  
                                                 
8 This implies that with our 10-years dataset, we are controlling for the effect of immigration (see the discussion on 
the importance of immigration in the introduction to this paper). Since results for the two datasets are very similar, 
we argue that while immigration is important, it cannot be the only reason for the US scale effect we observe. 
 
9 Our sample covers 509 Nobel prizes awarded in Chemistry, Medicine and Physics during 1901-2005.  The “All 
Other Countries” group received only 9 Nobel prizes, less than 2% of the total awarded.  This observation is 
consistent with the presence of strong scale effects discussed above. 
 
10 The empirical model we employ is similar to that implemented by Bernard and Busse (2004) for predicting 
Olympics medal counts. 
   10
Since the construction of the LHS variable (prize share) is censored on the left by zero, 
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In table 2, we report the results of our benchmark specification, in which we examine the 
impact of GDP and population on the incidence of prizes. Table 2A employs the 10-years panel 
in which each prize is registers at the time of the research for which the award was given. We 
observe an average lag of two decades between the time of research and the award. We also 
estimate the same specifications for the 5-years panel in which each prize is registered at the time 
of the award. Because of the observed lag between research and award, in table 2B, we lag the 
independent variables by 4 lags (20 years) for this dataset. We confirm the need to lag the 
independent macro variables by estimating specifications for different lag structures and 
observing that the optimal lag is indeed 20 years.
11  
Results in columns 1-3 (tables 2A and 2B) demonstrate that the incidence of Nobel 
winnings is clearly positively associated with GDP and negatively associated with population 
(after controlling for GDP). Results in columns 4-6 (tables 2A and 2B) confirm the same 
associations with a different dependent variable: The total number of prizes (Nobel, Fields, 
Kyoto and Wolf) awarded for each country-period as a share of the total awards for that period. 
In table 3, we present the complete specifications examining the importance of scale 
effects; repeating the same specifications for the 10-years and 5-years panels. Since results are 
 
11 We estimate the model with a variety of lag structures and in all cases the only coefficient that comes out 
significant is the (t-4) one – implying a lag of two decades. Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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qualitatively the same, we focus on the 10-years panel presented in table 3A. In column 1, we 
add to our benchmark specification the square of GDP. The coefficient is statistically significant 
at the 99% confidence level suggesting a clear incidence of scale effects.
12 In column 2, we 
employ, instead, binary variables that examine whether Germany before WWII and the U.S. after 
WWII are unique in the level of their exposure to prizes. We further speculate that, at least for 
the Nobel prize, there might be a home-team bias and therefore include a binary variable for 
Scandinavia. Pre-WWII Germany and post-WWII U.S. are clearly unique cases (with their 
coefficients significant at the 1% level). We find no evidence of home-team bias and discard this 
variable in all subsequent estimations. 
In column 3 (tables 3A and 3B) we add to the (GDP)
2 variable the dummy for post-WWII 
U.S. Since the coefficient on (GDP)
2 is not significant once the U.S. post-WWII dummy is 
included, we conclude that the dynamic scale effects we obtained are completely driven by the 
impact of the U.S. presence in this competition on prizes. This is also evidenced by the fact that 
our fit measures are not improved when (GDP)
2 is included in the specification (compare 
columns 2 and 3 (tables 3A and 3B). These results carry thorough once we use, as our dependent 
variable in columns 4-6 of tables 3A and 3B, the country share of total prizes (instead of the 
country share in Nobel prizes). 
In table 4, we investigate whether our results are driven by the destruction of WWII and 
not by the U.S.-dominated scale effects we observed. Using our measure of casualties during the 
war, we investigate it’s lag structure in columns 1-3. We find that the only significant effect can 
be found for a lag of 3 decades – i.e., deaths in the war negatively impact the viability of basic 
research about 30 years after the fact. This result, though, is not very robust. In columns 4-5 
(table 4), we examine whether the WWII destruction effect cannot be accounted for by the non-
linear changes in incomes or just by the rising post war dominance of the U.S. We find both of 
these hypotheses to be confirmed and conclude, not unlike Davis and Weinstein (2002 and 
2004), that the World Wars’ destruction did not have a long-term statistically observable effect 
on the production of basic research. Once again, we confirm, in column 5, that the post-War U.S. 
prominence in basic research dominates the scale effect. 
                                                 
12 This finding contrasts with a recent work, Rose (2006), that failed to find scale effects in: “the level of income, 
inflation, material well-being, health, education, the quality of a country’s institutions, heterogeneity, and a number 
of different international indices and rankings.”   12
Since we observed the increase in the share of prizes going to previously peripheral 
countries in the last two decades, we postulated that it is possible that the structure of the 
relationships we identified has recently changed. In table 5 column 1, we run the same 
specification as in table 3B column 1, but restrict our dataset to 1975-2004. We find no evidence 
of such change with results corresponding closely to the results obtained from the full dataset. 
Another interesting question is whether we can identify scale effects in the non-leading 
countries as well. In table 5 column 2, we re-run the specification in table 3B column 1 but 
exclude from our dataset the U.S. observations. Interestingly, the GDP
2 variable is no longer 
significant; this leads us to conclude that the scale effect we observed is indeed probably unique 
to the leader.  
Figure 7a reports the Nobel Prize shares of the US in two distinct ways.  The shaded 
curve, award time, reports the average Nobel share awarded to US residents per decade during 
the 20
th century (it is obtained from the five year panel described in data section).  The solid 
curve, real research time, reports the research share done in the US during the actual decade of 
the work credited later with the Nobel Prize, 1880s-1970s (it is obtained from the ten year panel 
described in the data section).  The difference between the two curves reflects the delay between 
the actual research, with average delay of two decades, and the impact of scholars’ mobility.  The 
solid curve indicates that the US basic research take-off, measured by actual research done in real 
research time, started during 1920s-1930s, reaching the maturity stage during 1940s-1970s.  
Comparing the two curves suggests that the first stage of the US take-off occurred prior to the 
immigration of talent propagated by the World Wars.  This immigration contributed to the speed 
and the intensity of US take-off.  Figure 7b reports the Nobel prizes shares for Germany applying 
similar methodology.  It vividly shows the Germany’s basic research leadership during the 
1890s-1920s, abruptly losing it during the 1930s. Comparing the two curves in Figure 7b reveals 
that the bulk of the actual basic research done in Germany during the 1920s was credited to other 
countries, as is suggested by the immigration patterns summarized in Table 1.  The 1930s was 
the watershed decade, where the US emerged as the undisputed basic research leader.  Both 7a 
and 7b implies that the World Wars set in motion forces that hasten the U.S. take-off, and 
suggests that immigration patterns accelerated this process.      
 
4.  Concluding remarks  13
Our empirical analysis confirms the importance of lagged relative GDP in accounting 
prize shares, and the presence of "winner takes all" scale effect.  The relative GDP variable 
accounts for the prize shares of the non-leading countries, yet it falls short in accounting the scale 
effects impacting the leading country. Intriguing observations dominating the patterns of basic 
research in the last hundred years are the leadership role of Germany during the first third of the 
20th century; and the rapid U.S. take-off during the 1930s, solidifying the U.S. basic research 
leadership position shortly after. Our analysis is consistent with the notion that the World Wars 
set in motion forces that hasten the U.S. take-off, and suggests that immigration patterns 
accelerated this process. 
We close the paper with several concluding remarks and a discussion of some open issues 
left for future research.  This work has investigated the process of producing basic research. We 
have not examined the links between successful basic research and private investment and 
corporate sector’s profitability and other possible social benefits. After all, basic research is 
rarely the end target and the economic literature has suggested a number of goals.  These issues 
have been examined before but no consensus has yet emerged from this literature (for a recent 
survey, see Salter and Martin, 2001). Some of these questions might be related to our own 
research on the preliminary stages of basic research since one expects that it would be easier to 
fund basic research in countries with deeper spillover from basic research to private (or public) 
rents. 
The interplay between the private and the public sector in promoting basic research deserves 
more investigation.  The basic research take-off of the U.S. happened during the first half of the 
20
th century, a time where the involvement of public funding in basic research was limited.  The 
solidification of the role of the U.S. as a hub of basic research happened during the second half of 
the 20
th centaury, a time of greater involvement of the public sector in funding or directing basic 
research.  This observation is validated in Figure 6, where the solid curve depicts the constant 
dollar involvement of the U.S. government in funding basic research by various sectors.
13  
Obtaining more detailed information about the private versus public funding of basic research in 
                                                 
13 The point is exemplified by the growing role of NSF, NIH, NASA [see Science and Engineering Indicators 
(2006)]; and is reinforced by the time lag between the actual research and the timing of awards. The NSF was 
established by the National Science Foundation Act of 1950. The NIH grew out from the Laboratory of Hygiene and 
was reorganized in 1930 by the Ransdell Act into the National Institutes of Health. NASA was established in 1958. 
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various countries could potentially enable researchers to identify the role of public funding in the 
take-off process.  
Besides the public-private funding issue, other factors might also lead to differing magnitudes 
of the scale effects in basic research across countries and time. In-depth studies of the role of 
research networks possibly using empirical methodology similar to the Erdös number project 
might shed some light on these questions. 
The recent diffusion of information technology has led to cheaper means of communication, 
and reduced the coordination costs of conducting joint research across geographical distance. The 
presence of these new technologies increases the spillovers from foreign to domestic research, as 
well as the possibility of greater cross-country collaborations. Whether the telecommunication 
revolution indeed changed the calculus of conducting basic research remains a challenge for 
future work.  
  In closing the paper, we would like to emphasize the inability of this kind of econometric 
inference to prove causality, and the limited predictive ability of correlations without the luxury 
of conducting controlled experiments—see Lucas’s (1976) critique of econometric policy 
evaluation. This is especially true in circumstances such as our case dealing with the black box 
process associated with creativity. An obvious implication of our study is that, in the presence of 
scale effects, a critical size is a necessary condition for basic research take-off.  While the 
evidence in this paper is consistent with the growing research importance of countries that used 
to be at the periphery of global research, it is a mistake to equate economic take-off with basic 
research take-off, as it may confuse necessary and sufficient conditions. A loose interpretation of 
the U.S. experience is that the growing allegiance of public and private resources helped in 
solidifying and speeding the basic research take-off. Yet, a growing body of economic research is 
cautioning us that the quality of public investment is determined by the overall quality of 
governance, transparency, contestability and openness of the allocation process.  These attributes 
are essential to prevent the misuse of public funds as a means of redistributing political rents.
14 
One expects the same to apply to the evaluation of the role of public funds in enhancing basic 
                                                 
14 See Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Everhart and Sumlinski (2001) and the reference therein. Everhart and 
Sumlinski (2001) concluded that “…corruption lowers the quality of public investment, and this poor quality public 
investment is associated with lower private investment.” 
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research.  Further investigation of all these issues is needed in order to provide us with better 
policy guidelines.   16
Appendix A 
  The following model is used to identity possible variables applied in our empirical study.  
Awarding Nobel laureates and similar prizes is the outcome of a periodic contest among the 
stock of major recent contributions.  The definition of “recent” is bounded by scholars’ life 
expectancy.  The intertemporal importance of major contributions is determined by the speed of 
diffusion of knowledge.  Short of having a tractable way of comparing the relative importance of 
the major contributions, we adopt a simple threshold approach:  all major scientific contributions 
vintage of the same year are treated as equal candidates for wining the prize contest.  The arrival 
rate of major contributions in a country depends on the human capital in the country, potentially 
interacted with the ‘global stock’ of human capital in non linear ways due to scale and 
networking effects.  Human capital evolves over time as the outcome of investment, adjusted for 
depreciation caused by aging, calamities [wars, etc…].  The investment in human capital depends 
positively on the scale of the economy that supports the research, like the real GDP, real GDP pre 
capita, etc.   
  Specifically, we sketch the following model for prizes:     
Notation
= t i, φ  Number of major contributions occurring in country i during time t that may qualify for a 
prize in a given discipline, scaled by the importance of the contribution. 
n
k t i − , φ  = contributions credited to country i dating to period t-k, net of the contributions that 
already won [i.e.,   is obtained by adjusting   downward by the contributions that were 
already rewarded].  
n
k t i − , φ k t i − , φ
∑
=





k t i t i d
0
, , φ = Stock of contributions credited to country i that may qualify for a prize at 
time t (net of contributions that were already awarded).  The stock is obtained by applying the 
discount factor to contributions going back T years ago, and T is the backward looking 
discounting horizon.   In practice, T is bounded by scholars’ life expectancy, and   is 
determined by the speed of diffusion of new contributions, apparently having an inverted U 
shape.   
k d
k d
  Assuming that the size of the prizes won relative to the pool of major new contributions is 
small, and that all contributions enter symmetrically, winning the prize is akin to sampling with   17
replacement.  Hence, the outcome of the Nobel contest may be approximated by generalized 
Bernoulli trials, with its convenient Gaussian properties.    
  Subject to all these assumptions, the probability wining a prize at time t by country i in a 














,  ;  
where N is the number of countries engaging in active basic research. 
We parameterize the flows of new contributions of country i as a proportion   of the 
human capital index,[] ;   
i k
β
t i H ,
 
 (A2)  ,    []
β φ t i i t i H k , , =
where β > 0 captures any scale effects.  Complementarities between local and global knowledge 
may be captured by a CES aggregator:  
 
   (A2’)  [] [] {} γ
β
γ γ φ t i t i i i t i H a H a k ) 1 ( , , − + =  
 
where  t H  denotes the foreign human capital [i.e., the sum of the human capital of all other 
countries], and 1- a  measures the externality associated with research attributed to foreign 
human capital.  The human capital of country i follows a simple accumulation rule: a fraction   
the real GDP is invested into forming future human capital;
t i c ,
15 fraction  t i, δ  depreciates, due to 
aging, wars, etc… 
 
   (A3)  1 , , 1 , , , ) 1 ( − − + − = t i t i t i t i t i Y c H H δ . 
 
To illustrate the model, we consider first the case where periods are set to cover a generation of 
scientists, say 25 years, such that  1 , = t i δ , hence 
                                                 
15 If basic research is “luxury activity,”  would increase with the GDP per Capita.  In these 
circumstances, our model predicts that the prize share of a country would depend positively on lagged 
GDP, and negatively on lagged population.   
t i c ,  18
 (A3’)      1 , , , − = t i t i t i Y c H
  Suppose that we aggregate all the countries doing frontier research into 2 blocks, say the 
U.S. and all other countries (OAC) that are part of the research frontier.  The OAC block is 
assumed to be composed of n symmetric countries.  These assumptions allow us to solve the 
prize share of the U.S. as a function of the lagged real U.S. GDP relative to all other countries 
GDP, denoted by   (i.e.,  ).  Assuming identical productivity structure across 
countries [i.e., both blocks have the same k, c, and a], we can infer that: 
Γ 1 , 1 , / − − = Γ AOC US Y Y
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A useful benchmark is the case where a = 1, corresponding to the absence of the global human 
capital externality:  







Figure 3a plots the U.S. share of the prizes predicted by our model as a function of the 
relative GDP share of the U.S./AOC.  The bold curve corresponds to the benchmark case of two 
countries (n = 1), the absence of foreign human capital externality (a = 1), and significant scale 
effects ( 2 = β ).  The solid curve to the left of the bold one modifies the benchmark by 
considering the case where AOC are composed of two symmetric countries (n = 2; a =1). Note 
that more fractured composition of AOC reduces the research effectiveness there, increasing 
thereby U.S. share.  The dotted curve modifies the benchmark by allowing modest human capital 
externality (n = 1, a = 0.95).  Human capital externality increases the share of the smaller block, 
at the expense of the larger block.  Figure 3b plots the same curves in the absence of returns to 
scale in research ( 1 = β ).  Removing scale effects considerably mitigates the prize share of the 
larger block (increasing thereby the share of the smaller block).  It also implies simple additivity 
of the countries composting the block of AOC, and eliminates the inflection point. 
The presence of scale effects implies that the association between the relative GDP shares 
and the prize share of the U.S. resembles a logistic curve.  Specifically, (4’) implies that for   19
relatively small countries, the initial effect of higher GDP share on the prize share is nil:  
for  |0 /0 US ds d Γ= Γ= 1 β > .  As the GDP share grows further, it increases the prize share at an 
accelerating rate, reflecting the growing impact of scale effects.  This acceleration reaches its 
peak and the inflection point when the U.S. relative GDP equals  [ ]
β β β β
/ 1 1 ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ~ + − = Γ
− n .  
From then on, further increase of the GDP share increase the prize share at diminishing rates.
16   
It also follows that greater scale effects implies higher threshold of relative GDP is needed in 
order to reach the “taking off” range associated with the accelerating increase in the prize share.  
Once this range has been reached, the takeoff is faster.  This result is illustrated in Figure 4a, 
focusing on the case where the scale effect is magnified from 2 [the bold curve] to 4 [the dotted 
curve], drawn for the case where AOC is composed of a unique country.  Figure 4b replicates 
this exercise for the case where the AOC is fractured into two symmetric countries.  As one may 
expect, it implies that the U.S. takes off at a lower relative share.   
 
                                                 

















22 1 [/ ] [ ( 1 )( 1 ) US sign d s d sign n ]
β β ββ
− Γ= − − +Γ.   20
Appendix B – Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table B1 – Data definitions and sources 
 Data  Definition  Source 




Wolf  Wolf Foundation prize awards in Agriculture, Chemistry, 
Mathematics, Medicine and Physics, 1978-2005.  http://www.wolffund.org.il/main.asp
Kyoto  Kyoto prize awards in Basic Science and Advanced 
Technology, 1985-2005.  http://www.kyotoprize.org/
Field  Fields medal in Mathematics, 1936-2002. 
  http://www.mathunion.org/medals/Fields/
 
GDP  Gross domestic product in million 1990 International 
dollars.  Maddison (2003) 
POP  Population in thousands at mid-year 
  Maddison (2003) 
WWI casualties  Total casualties in World War I 
  http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0004617.html
WWII casualties  Total casualties in World War II 
  http://www.secondworldwar.co.uk/casualty.html
 
Table B2 - Descriptive Statistics – Prizes – 5-years Dataset 




St. Dev. Of 
observations 
 
Nobel  509  2.42 4.49   
Wolf  199  0.95 3.40   
Kyoto  46  0.22 1.05   
Field  44  0.21 0.61   
 
Table B3 - Prizes correlations – 5-years Dataset 
 Kyoto Field Wolf 
Nobel 0.63 0.57 0.67 
Kyoto 1 0.41  0.64 
Field 0.41  1  0.54 
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Figure 1A: Nobel Shares by Country 
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Figure 1B 
Combined prize shares of AOC = All Countries - [Europe + U.S.] 
The blue curve plots AOC share of Nobel prizes for basic science.  The red curve plots AOC 
share of Nobel, Fields, Kyoto, and Wolf prizes for basic research.   24
 
US GDP and Nobel Shares, 1900-2005
y = -0.0128x
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Figure 2: U.S. Nobel shares during the 20
th century and lagged U.S. share of World GDP 
The line corresponds to a third order polynomial trend line   25
 
Figure 3A 
U.S. prize share and the relative U.S./AOC GDP, with scale effects ( 2 = β ). 
 
Figure 3B 
U.S. prize share and the relative U.S./AOC GDP, no scale effects ( 1 = β ). 
The bold curve corresponds to the base case: the absence of externalities associated with foreign human capital, 
where the AOC block is composed of one country ( 1 ; 1 = = n a ).  The solid curve modifies the base case by 
assuming that the AOC block is composed of two symmetric countries ( 2 ; 1 = = n a ).  The dotted curve modifies 
the base case by assuming modest externality where foreign human capital increases the efficacy of domestic human 
capital ( ).  1 ; 95 . 0 = = n a  26
 
Figure  4A        Figure  4B 
       AOC composed of one country                   AOC composed of two countries 
    
U.S. prize share and the relative U.S./AOC GDP, varying scale effects 
The bold curve corresponds to the base case of scale effect ( 2 = β ), and no externality associated 
with foreign human capital (a = 1).  The dotted curve corresponds to magnified scale 
effects, 4 = β , a = 1.  The top panel assumes symmetry, where the AOC is, like the U.S., 
composed on one country.  The lower panel assumed fractured AOC, composed of two 
symmetric countries.     
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U.S. Nobel shares / lagged U.S. share of World GDP during the 20
th centaury 
































































































































































































































































































Federal supported R&D spending, 1955-2005 [total, and shares of R&D preformed by 
various sectors] 
 
Right scale, the Solid curve: Total federal obligations for R&D, FY 1955–2005; Constant 2000 $ (billions) 
 
Left scale: Share of federal total obligations for R&D supported by the government, by the performing sectors.  The 
sectors, from top to bottom, are: 
Industry, Government R&D, Universities, Federally Funded R&D centers (FFRDC), and Non-profits  
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Figure 7a 
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Figure 7b 
Germany Prize share, real research time (1880s-1970s), award time (1900s-1990s)  29
Table 1A - Destinations for Immigrant Nobel Prize Winners (>5) 
 
  1901-1935 1936-1970 1971-2005  Total 
United  States 3  29 44 76 
United  Kingdom  4 8 7  19 
Switzerland 1 3 9  13 
Germany  5 2 2 9 
France  4 1 1 6 
Number of prize-winners that immigrated to the destination countries listed in column 1. 
 
Table 1B - Country of Origin for Immigrant Nobel Prize Winners (>5) 
 
  1901-1935 1936-1970 1971-2005  Total 
Germany  2  12 14 28 
Austria  3 5 3  11 
United  Kingdom  1 1 6 8 
Canada  0 2 5 7 
Hungary  1 3 3 7 
Poland  2 2 3 7 
Russia  1 2 2 5 
Italy  1 2 3 6 
Netherlands 1 1 3 5 
France  2 2 1 5 
China  0 3 2 5 
Number of prize-winners that emigrated from the countries-of-origin listed in column 1. 
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Table 2A – Benchmark Regression – 10-years Data 
 
LHS: Nobel  All  Prizes 

































Observations  100 100 100 100 100 100
Decomposition fit 
measure  0.23 0.16 0.47 0.29  0.11 0.52
Note: Dependent variable is the prize share (in %) per country-decade observation. The model is estimated with 
a Tobit methodology. T-statistics in parentheses; significance levels are 10% *, 5% ** and 1%***. σ is the 
estimated standard deviation of the error term. The decomposition fit measure is a goodness-of-fit measure for 
non-linear models (for details see Greene, 2002). 
 
Table 2B – Benchmark Regression – 5-years Data 
 
LHS: Nobel  All  Prizes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 










POP/W   (t-4) 





















Observations  205 201 201 201 201 201
Decomposition fit 
measure  0.18 0.21 0.34 0.20  0.15  0.38 
Note: Dependent variable is the prize share (in %) per country-5-years observation. The model is estimated with 
a Tobit methodology. T-statistics in parentheses; significance levels are 10% *, 5% ** and 1%***. σ is the 
estimated standard deviation of the error term. The decomposition fit measure is a goodness-of-fit measure for 
non-linear models (for details see Greene, 2002). 
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Table 3A – Scale Regressions – 10-years Data 
 
LHS: Nobels  All  Prizes 





































































100 100 100 100 100 100
Decomposition fit 
measure 
0.60 0.79 0.75 0.64 0.81 0.77
Note: Dependent variable is the prize share (in %) per country-decade observation. The model is estimated with a Tobit 
methodology. T-statistics in parentheses; significance levels are 10% *, 5% ** and 1%***. σ is the estimated standard 
deviation of the error term. The decomposition fit measure is a goodness-of-fit measure for non-linear models (for 
details see Greene, 2002). 
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Table 3B – Scale Regressions – 5-years Data 
 
LHS: Nobels  All  Prizes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 


























Pre-1930 Germany    24.069*** 
(7.577)   22.823*** 
(6.196)
Post-1930 U.S.    35.104*** 
(7.368)
27.354***




Scandinavia   1.970 
(0.715)   3.011 
(1.318)
(GDP/W)
























201 201 201 201 201 201
Decomposition fit 
measure 
0.46 0.60 0.52 0.49 0.65 0.56
Note: Dependent variable is the prize share (in %) per country-5-years observation. The model is estimated with a 
Tobit methodology. T-statistics in parentheses; significance levels are 10% *, 5% ** and 1%***. σ is the estimated 
standard deviation of the error term. The decomposition fit measure is a goodness-of-fit measure for non-linear models 
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Table 4 –Regressions – WW Casualties – 10-years data 
 
LHS:   Nobels 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)





























































Post-1930 U.S.   
42.263*** 
(6.233)











  100 100 100 100 100
Decomposition fit 
measure  0.47 0.51 0.52 0.61 0.76
Note: Dependent variable is the prize share (in %) per country-decade observation. The model is 
estimated with a Tobit methodology. T-statistics in parentheses; significance levels are 10% *, 5% 
** and 1%***. σ is the estimated standard deviation of the error term. The decomposition fit 
measure is a goodness-of-fit measure for non-linear models (for details see Greene, 2002). 
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60 180  
Decomposition fit 
measure 
0.93 0.13  
Note: Dependent variable is the prize share (in %) per country-5-years observation. The model is estimated with 
a Tobit methodology. T-statistics in parentheses; significance levels are 10% *, 5% ** and 1%***. σ is the 
estimated standard deviation of the error term. The decomposition fit measure is a goodness-of-fit measure for 
non-linear models (for details see Greene, 2002). 
 
 
  
 